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Nato 3.0: Will America defend Europe against Russia? | The Economist
7/10TL;DR
NATO is entering a new burden-sharing phase in which Europe is expected to do more, but US force levels, base access and nuclear guarantees remain under review rather than fully settled.
KEY POINTS
A new balance inside NATO
Officials increasingly describe the current shift as “NATO 3.0”, a model in which European allies take on a larger share of conventional defense responsibilities. The debate comes at a sensitive moment, with a US posture review examining what military presence and commitments Washington will maintain in Europe in the coming years, including in a potential crisis in 2028 or 2029.
US force posture is still under review
The review ordered by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is intended to clarify what forces the US will keep in Europe and how they would be used. Senior military commanders have emphasized that American forces on the continent serve three functions at once: defending US security in Europe, supporting NATO, and enabling US power projection into other regions. That broader role means the debate is not limited to alliance obligations alone.
Europe remains strategically important to Washington
Despite a long-term US strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific, military thinking in the alliance still treats Europe as central to American security. One formulation circulating in allied circles is that defending Europe’s eastern flank also helps defend the eastern coast of America. The appointment of General Nick Perry as the first UK commander of Joint Force Command Norfolk, responsible for the North Atlantic and Northern Europe, underlines the transatlantic link.
The shift predates the current administration
Pressure for Europe to carry more of the defense burden did not begin recently. The argument stretches back at least to Barack Obama’s pivot toward Asia and earlier warnings from Robert Gates that allies needed to invest more. What is changing now is the pace and urgency, as the US weighs global demands while trying to preserve deterrence in Europe.
Bases, overflight and access are emerging friction points
One of the most delicate issues in the review is whether the US can count on broad access to bases, airspace and infrastructure in Europe for military operations beyond the continent. Tensions surfaced during the recent confrontation involving Iran, when some European governments were initially reluctant to let their territory be used for strikes. The UK ultimately allowed use of RAF Fairford, and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean also figured in the operational picture.
Washington wants reliability, allies want legal control
The US view is that years of investment in bases and bilateral defense arrangements should translate into dependable wartime access. Many European governments, however, insist that sovereign states must still judge proposed operations under international law and national political constraints. That creates a recurring tension between military flexibility for Washington and legal-political oversight in host countries.
Greenland and northern routes sharpen the debate
Negotiations involving Denmark and Greenland have highlighted how strategically valuable northern bases and transit routes have become. Access questions are no longer limited to old Cold War facilities in continental Europe but increasingly involve Arctic and North Atlantic geography. That makes command structures such as Norfolk more important to both NATO planning and US homeland security.
US nuclear guarantees remain firm
On nuclear deterrence, allied officials say messages from Washington have been strongly reassuring in both private and public channels. The core signal is that the US nuclear umbrella over NATO remains in place even as conventional posture is reassessed. For many allies, that assurance is the single most important stabilizing factor in the current transition.
France and Britain are more visible in the nuclear debate
At the same time, France has intensified discussion of a stronger European nuclear role, following remarks by President Emmanuel Macron about some form of extended deterrence. The details remain undefined, but the broader aim is clearer: to show that France, the UK and the US together can deter a nuclear threat from Russia. That does not replace the US role, but it signals a more active European contribution.
CONCLUSION
The alliance is moving toward a model in which Europe assumes greater conventional responsibility while still depending on US strategic backing. The unresolved questions are not whether the transatlantic link endures, but how much force, access and autonomy each side will accept in the next phase.
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