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Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE can't stop the Yemen war | The Economist
4/10TL;DR
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remain close allies in some arenas, but a deepening rivalry between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed is reshaping Gulf policy from Yemen to Sudan and the Horn of Africa.
KEY POINTS
From partnership to rivalry
Saudi Arabia and the UAE long appeared strategically aligned: both are wealthy monarchies, major oil producers and influential Gulf powers led by ambitious rulers, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed. They coordinated closely on major regional moves, including the 2015 intervention in Yemen and the campaign against Qatar. That alignment has weakened as competition over leadership, influence and methods has intensified.
Personal tensions at the top
Part of the rupture appears rooted in clashing ambitions. MBS sees Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf state and economy, as the natural leader of the region and has sought to set the broader Gulf agenda. MBZ, whose state has built an image as a nimble middle power and global commercial hub, has resisted subordination to Riyadh, turning policy disagreements into a broader geopolitical contest.
Different foreign-policy models
The split is not only personal. Saudi Arabia tends to favor a conventional state-centric order in which sovereignty and territorial unity are paramount, reflecting its self-image as a leader of the Arab and Muslim worlds. The UAE has shown greater willingness to work beyond traditional state structures, partner with non-state actors and pursue influence through trade, ports, finance and flexible regional alignments.
Yemen exposed the divide
In Yemen, both states share an interest in rolling back the Houthis, but they backed different local partners. Saudi Arabia supported forces committed to preserving a unified Yemeni state, while the UAE built ties with the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist movement seeking to restore an independent South Yemen. The split became so severe that Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed forces eventually clashed, undercutting their shared objective.
Sudan became another battleground
The divergence is also visible in Sudan. Saudi Arabia has leaned toward the Sudanese state and army, seeing stability across the Red Sea as a core security interest. The UAE, by contrast, has been seen as cultivating ties with the Rapid Support Forces, viewing local armed actors as useful partners for advancing commercial access and influence.
Ports, trade routes and the Red Sea
For the UAE, infrastructure and port investments along the Red Sea and nearby coasts are central to its regional strategy. For Saudi Arabia, the same maritime space is increasingly a hard-security priority, especially because the narrowest point across the Red Sea from Sudan is only about 200 kilometers. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has made Red Sea export routes even more important for Saudi oil shipments.
Commercial interests may be prolonging war
Critics argue that the Emirati approach in Sudan has helped deepen a war already driven by looting, illicit finance and fragmented armed power. Commercial links can create channels for resources such as gold to be monetized and moved, increasing incentives for combatants to keep fighting. The multiplication of outside backers also adds complexity, which historically makes wars harder to settle.
Food security drives Gulf competition in Africa
The rivalry extends to the Horn of Africa, where Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have spent heavily on farmland and water access. Because the Gulf cannot produce enough food domestically, governments have sought fertile land overseas, including along the Nile in Sudan, to grow crops for export back to the Gulf. That strategy has alarmed local communities, who see land and water being redirected away from domestic needs.
A strategy under growing criticism
Opponents of the land-acquisition model argue it was flawed from the start. The Gulf’s problem is less a global shortage of food than the security of shipping lanes needed to import it. By backing rival factions and contributing to instability in agricultural regions, Gulf powers risk undermining the very food and trade security they seek to protect.
CONCLUSION
The Saudi-Emirati relationship remains important to Gulf politics, but it is now marked by a rivalry that is as much about competing visions of regional order as it is about leadership. That competition is not only reshaping alliances across the Middle East and Africa, but also worsening conflicts that threaten both countries’ long-term interests.
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