
Tech • AI • Robotics • Game
The AI boom is intensifying a global dependency on a highly concentrated semiconductor supply chain, while US export controls appear to be accelerating China’s self-sufficiency and weakening the economic deterrent that has helped protect Taiwan.
The expansion of artificial intelligence depends on massive computing power, especially GPUs, high-performance memory and advanced data-center networking. That makes AI not only a software story but also an industrial one, centered on the production of cutting-edge semiconductors capable of handling billions of operations per second.
Nvidia, once dominant in the Chinese AI chip market, has been losing ground as US restrictions tightened. By 2025, its share was already around 40%, roughly level with Huawei. Projections for 2026 point to Nvidia dropping to 8%, while Huawei could reach 50% and Chinese domestic suppliers together exceed 56% of the market.
Washington’s strategy aimed to slow China’s military and civilian AI progress by cutting access to the most advanced American chips. In practice, the restrictions did not eliminate Chinese demand for AI hardware; they shifted that demand toward domestic suppliers, especially Huawei, handing local firms a market worth tens of billions of dollars a year.
Advanced chip production relies on a narrow set of industrial specialists. Nvidia designs many of the leading chips but depends on manufacturers such as TSMC in Taiwan to fabricate them. That fabrication process in turn depends on highly specialized lithography equipment, creating a chain in which a disruption at one point can ripple across the global digital economy.
Dutch company ASML is central because it makes the most advanced lithography systems used to etch microscopic patterns onto chips. These machines are among the most complex industrial tools ever built. Control over such equipment has become a geopolitical lever, especially because access to top-end lithography has long been one of the main barriers to Chinese semiconductor progress.
Reports in July 2026 indicated that a state-backed startup in Shanghai had begun mass production of its own immersion lithography machines. While that does not erase the technological gap at the top end, it suggests the barrier around China’s semiconductor industry is becoming less effective and that progress is happening faster than many Western policymakers expected.
A proposed US measure known as the MATCH Act would reportedly go beyond blocking new machine sales to China and also restrict maintenance for equipment already installed there. That tougher approach may deepen the paradox at the heart of current policy: each new sanction creates stronger incentives for Beijing to invest faster and more heavily in a fully domestic chip ecosystem.
The biggest strategic risk lies not in chip design but in manufacturing concentration, especially in Taiwan, where TSMC produces many of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. Those chips underpin smartphones, AI data centers and major parts of Western defense industry capacity, making Taiwan a single critical node for the modern economy.
For years, the idea of a silicon shield suggested that China would avoid major escalation against Taiwan because it also depended on Taiwanese chip production. But as China builds more of its own semiconductor tools and fabrication capabilities, that mutual dependence could diminish. If reliance on Taiwan falls, so may one of the strongest economic arguments for preserving the status quo.
Bloomberg Economics has estimated that a year-long conflict around Taiwan could cost the world about $10.6 trillion, or roughly 9.6% of global GDP, in a single year. Rhodium Group, using a narrower scenario focused on a blockade and excluding sanctions or military escalation, estimated more than $2 trillion of economic activity directly at risk, including $1.6 trillion in semiconductor-dependent sectors such as autos, electronics and computing.
The contest over AI is increasingly a contest over who can design, fabricate and secure the chips behind it. As China reduces its dependence on foreign technology and Taiwan remains the industry’s most fragile chokepoint, the semiconductor supply chain is becoming one of the world’s most consequential geopolitical fault lines.
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