Tech • AI • Robotics • Game
Why Russia is building its own version of Starlink | The Economist
6/10TL;DR
Russia and Ukraine are locked in a rapid technology race in which satellite networks, drones and missile strikes may shape the next phase of the war more than limited frontline shifts.
KEY POINTS
Russian satellite ambitions
Russia is developing a domestic satellite communications network described as a potential equivalent to Starlink. The system has already launched dozens of satellites, though it is not yet functioning reliably. If it becomes operational within the coming months, it could significantly improve Russian targeting and battlefield connectivity across Ukraine.
Why Starlink access matters
Expanded Russian satellite capability could allow forces to detect and strike targets with far greater speed and precision. By contrast, Ukraine still faces restrictions on using Starlink for operations over Russian territory, limiting its ability to target missile launchers before they fire. That constraint has sharpened debate over whether outside pressure could persuade Elon Musk to permit broader use, especially as Russia continues missile attacks on civilian areas.
A war driven by fast innovation
The conflict is increasingly defined by a race to deploy cheaper, faster and harder-to-stop weapons. Both sides are adapting quickly, but Russian forces have repeatedly shown an ability to absorb new battlefield ideas and scale them up within months. That pattern has already appeared in areas such as fiber-optic drones and jet-powered drone systems.
New “mothership” drone threat
Kyiv recently saw what was described as its first “mothership” attack drone, a larger platform designed to carry and release multiple smaller FPV drones. The initial appearance was seen as experimental, but such systems could become more common after a short development cycle. Smaller drones released near a target are harder for air defenses to track and intercept, raising concern about future mass attacks on cities.
Terror tactics against civilians
Russian use of FPV drones has also been linked to what is being described as “safari tactics,” with drones hunting civilian vehicles in settlements near the front. Beyond the physical damage, such attacks are aimed at creating fear and disrupting daily life. If such tactics spread toward major cities, they could deepen pressure on civilians already living under missile and drone threat.
Frontline changes remain limited
Despite the intensity of fighting, territorial movement has remained small relative to the size of Ukraine. Estimated net territorial change this year has been put at about 100 square kilometers, roughly compared with the area inside Paris’s ring road. Some analysts now argue that Ukraine has shown growing skill in tactical local gains, producing what can be described less as a stalemate than a dynamic equilibrium.
Russia’s high casualty cost
Those limited gains have come at an extraordinary human cost for Russia. Monthly Russian casualties are estimated at about 40,000, a figure said to exceed the number of Soviet losses during the entire 10-year Afghanistan war in just one month. Even so, the scale of losses has not yet translated into a near-term collapse of Russian manpower generation.
Attrition still favors Moscow’s strategy
Russian recruitment may be lagging behind killed and wounded totals, but Moscow is still finding enough men to sustain the war. There are also concerns that further mobilization could be expanded quietly rather than announced openly. In a war of attrition, Vladimir Putin is seen as believing that Russia retains advantages in men, material and money, especially in ballistic missiles and drone production.
Peace talk skepticism in Kyiv
Fresh discussion of negotiations and a possible mutual energy ceasefire has not generated much confidence in Kyiv. While more diplomacy may emerge in the coming weeks, there is little expectation of a meaningful settlement before winter passes. The central reason is strategic: if Putin believes winter strikes can inflict greater pain on Ukraine, there is little incentive for the Kremlin to pause now.
CONCLUSION
The war is entering a phase where technical adaptation may matter as much as manpower, and possibly more than small territorial shifts. Unless the balance in strike capability changes, Russia appears likely to keep pressing its advantage through winter while serious peace prospects remain remote.
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